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PRE-EMPTION OF LOCAL RENT CONTROL
LAWS BY HUD REGULATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Within the past two years, the plight of many urban tenants has been
complicated by a new and controversial regulation promulgated by the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).' The regulation
supersedes state and local rent control laws with respect to projects financially
supported by mortgages insured or held by HUD. 2 Two distinct groups of
tenants have been affected by the regulation. HUD has pre-empted the entire
field of rent control with respect to low and moderate income tenants living in
projects that are both subsidized and insured by the federal government. 3 The
Department has also indicated that it will pre-empt local rent control laws
relating to upper-middle and upper income families in projects that are
federally insured, even though they are not otherwise federally subsidized. 4
Here, the Department will proceed on a case by case basis, only acting when
the delay or decision of a local rent control board places the project in
economic jeopardy.5 The new HUD regulation has been criticized as an
unnecessary intrusion into an area traditionally regulated by the states and as
an example of federal insensitivity to the needs of urban tenants in an
inflationary economy. 6 This Note will examine these criticisms and also the
relation of the pre-emption doctrine 7 to the federal regulatory agency.,
Relevant mortgage insurance programs under the National Housing Act 9 and
the HUD regulation itself l ° will be discussed in detail in order to elucidate the
extent of federal economic and regulatory involvement in projects insured by
HUD. Finally, this Note will review several recent cases spawned by the
HUD regulation. "
A. The Federal Pre-emption Doctrine
The doctrine of federal pre-emption is founded upon the supremacy clause
of the Constitution.' 2 However, at the outset, it should be noted that there is
1. 24 C.F.R. § 403 (1976); see N.Y. Times, June 6, 1976, § 8, at 1, col. 1
2. 24 C.F.R. §§ 403.5, 403.9 (1976).
3. See notes 91-93 infra and accompanying text.
4. See notes 97-99 infra and accompanying text.
5. See note 99 infra and accompanying text.
6. See note 107 infra and accompanying text.
7. See notes 12-34 infra and accompanying text.
8. See notes 35-53 infra and accompanying text.
9- See notes 54-77 infra and accompanying text.
10. See notes 78-107 infra and accompanying text.
11. See notes 108-71 infra and accompanying text.
12. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof.. . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby; any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. See Note, Parker v. Brown: A Preemption Analysis, 84 Yale L.J. 1164,
1167 (1975).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45
a critical analytical distinction between true "pre-emption" and the literal
meaning of the supremacy clause. The supremacy clause invalidates state
laws actually in conflict with federal law. The pre-emption doctrine strikes
down all state laws in the area validly pre-empted.' 3 Despite this distinction,
the two have been used interchangeably. 14
The Constitution delegates a broad spectrum of powers to Congress in
Article I.15 With the exception of specific functions reserved to the national
government, 16 the states may concurrently regulate areas affected by federal
legislation as a legitimate exercise of their police power. 17 The supremacy
clause, however, mandates that federal law displace concurrent state law
when the two are incompatible.1 8 Hence, state regulation of the public health,
safety, welfare or morals is often tempered by federal control of the same
subject matter. 19 Therefore, any consideration of coexisting federal and state
legislation affecting the same subject matter must be made within the
historical and constitutional context of a system designed to preserve unity
among the states in areas where Congress has chosen to act. 20
13. See Freeman, Dynamic Federalism and the Concept of Preemption, 21 DePaul L. Rev.
630, 636 n.34 (1972); Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and
the Burger Court, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 623, 636 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Shifting Perspectives).
See generally Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. Ill. L.F. 515; Note,
Federal Pre-emption of State Laws: The Effect of Regulatory Agency Attitudes on Judicial
Decisionmaking, 50 Ind. L.J. 848 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Federal Pre-emption].
14. See, e.g., Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971); California v. Zook, 336 U.S, 725
(1949); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947); Freeman, Dynamic Federalism and
the Concept of Preemption, 21 DePaul L. Rev. 630 (1972); Comment, A Conceptual Refinement
of the Doctrine of Federal Preemption, 22 J. Pub. L. 391 (1973).
15. For the purposes of this discussion, particular import rests on the general welfare clause
(U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1), the commerce clause (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3) and the
necessary and proper clause (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18) since these are frequent sources of
federal powers analogous to the state police powers (see note 17 infra). See Note, Environmental
Control: Higher State Standards and the Question of Preemption, 55 Cornell L. Rev. 846, 849-50
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Cornell L. Rev.].
16. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
17. Cornell L. Rev., supra note 15, at 851. The tenth amendment to the Constitution, which
states that "[tlhe powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people" is the source of tle police
powers of the states and their political subdivisions. Comment, Environmental Law-
Aircraft Noise Regulation-Federal Pre-emption, 20 N.Y.L.F. 165, 167 n.16, citing Northern
States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd without opinion,
405 U.S. 1035 (1972). Traditional state police powers include regulation of the health, safety,
welfare and morals of its citizens. Cornell L. Rev., supra note 15, at 849. Such regulations must
be reasonable and bear a rational relation to the evil sought to be remedied. See Lawton v. Steele,
152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894).
18. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963); Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); Shifting Perspectives, supra note 13, at 623.
19. Cornell L. Rev., supra note 15, at 850.
20. Note, Parker v. Brown: A Preemption Analysis, 84 Yale L.J. 1164, 1167 (1975). For a
general discussion of the constitutional background, see Hart, The Relations Between State and
Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489 (1954).
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Before analyzing the pre-emptive capabilities of any federal statute, it must
be established that the law has been properly enacted pursuant to a power
delegated to Congress by the Constitution. 2 Once this has been determined,
the inquiry shifts to the manner in which Congress has exercised its power
and the crucial issue becomes whether the state has been precluded from
regulating the same subject matter.22 It is often difficult to ascertain the intent
of Congress in this regard.2 3 The Supreme Court in Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul24 utilized a two-pronged test which states the essence of
federal pre-emption analysis.25 In order for a federal statute to supersede
concurrent state legislation, either an "irreconcilable conflict"2 6 must exist
between the state and federal regulations, or Congress must have clearly
"ordained that the state regulation shall yield."' 7
The first part of the Florida Lime test focuses on the nullification under the
supremacy clause of an otherwise valid state law when conflict with federal
law is inescapable and compliance with both statutes is impossible.2' The
court must first construe the coexisting pieces of legislation in order to
determine whether the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." - 9 State law
has also been pre-empted when it was only potentially incompatible with
federal regulation. 30 If such a conflict exists, the state law may be pre-empted
even if it was enacted pursuant to traditional state powers and regardless of
the law's importance to the state. 3'
The second facet of the Florida Lime test focuses on the intent of Congress
to exclude concurrent state legislation. If this intent is clearly manifested on
the face of the federal statute, state regulation of the same subject matter
21. Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1146 (8th Cir 1971), aff'd
without opinion, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
22. Id.
23. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230-31 (1947).
24. 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
25. Wallach, Whose Intent? A Study of Administrative Preemption: State Regulation of
Cable Television, 25 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 258, 264 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Wallach)-
26. 373 U.S. at 146.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 142-43. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649-50 (1971), Head v. New Mexico
Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424, 430 (1963).
29. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S 351 (1976).
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132. 142 (1963).
30. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 509 (1956). It has been suggested that such a
potential conflict ground for pre-emption was a manifestation of a presumption in favor of federal
law during the New Deal Era and has since been abrogated in New York State Dep't of Social
Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973), where the Supreme Court held that conflicts must be
substantial in order to invoke the supremacy clause. Shifting Perspectives, supra note 13, at
647-48.
31. Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962). See Wissner v. Wissner. 338 U.S. 655, 660
(1950); In re Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 597, 517 P.2d 449, 452, 111 Cal. Rptr 369,
372 (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 825 (1974).
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must yield, 32 even if it merely supplements the congressional scheme and
does not conflict with federal law. 33 However, if Congress does not expressly
forbid the exertion of concurrent state jurisdiction, an exclusionary intent may
be deduced from several factors inherent in the federal statutory design:
the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by [federal law]
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress .... Such a purpose may
be evidenced in several ways. The scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as
to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to
supplement it. . . .Or the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal
interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement
of state laws on the same subjectA4
B. The Pre-emption Doctrine and the Federal Regulatory Agency
The ability of Congress to delegate its power to a federal regulatory agency
in order to preserve the vitality of the legislative function is now well
recognized. 35 "Congress may declare its will, and after fixing a primary
standard, devolve upon administrative officers the 'power to fill up the
details' by prescribing administrative rules and regulations. '36 Thus, the
32. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
33. Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1146 (1971), aff'd without
opinion, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972); see Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 302 (1961); Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 235-36 (1947). For examples of federal statutes which expressly
pre-empt state regulation, see 15 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970) (Fair Packaging and Labeling Program); 21
U.S.C. § 678 (1970) (Meat Inspection Act).
34. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (emphasis added). Thus, state
laws have been pre-empted where national uniformity was required to implement congressional
purposes. E.g., Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 300-01 (1961) (standards for classification and
inspection of tobacco held to be a subject requiring national uniformity under the Federal
Tobacco Inspection Act); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 73-74 (1941) (registration of aliens
found to require national uniformity under Federal Alien Registration Act). See also Florida Lime
& Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 147 (1963); Head v. New Mexico Bd. of
Examiners, 374 U.S. 424, 430 (1963); Shifting Perspectives, supra note 13, at 625. It should be
noted that rent control is not a subject requiring national uniformity since HUD establishes the
appropriate charges on a case by case basis. Columbia Plaza Ltd. Partnership v. Cowles, 403 F.
Supp. 1337, 1342 (D.D.C. 1975).
Several writers have critized judicial implication of intent to pre-empt state and local
jurisdictions where there has been no clear expression by Congress and no evidence in the
legislative history that the pre-emption issue was ever considered. Wham & Merrill, Federal
Pre-emption: How to Protect the States' Jurisdiction, 43 A.B.A.J. 131 (1957); Note, Pre-emption
as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 208, 209, 224 (1958).
However, it has been suggested that with a recent return to a state oriented pre-emption doctrine,
state law will not be usurped unless Congress clearly manifests an actual intent to do so. Shifting
Perspectives, supra note 13, at 623, 645. But see DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), in which
the Supreme Court examined the comprehensiveness of the Immigration and Nationality Act in
its consideration of implied congressional intent to pre-empt, thus demonstrating that the Rice
factors are still intact. See 424 U.S. at 359.
35. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 398 (1940).
36. United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 85 (1932). See K. Davis,
Adminstrative Law § 2.01 (3d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Davis].
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courts have repeatedly sustained broad and vague standards of agency
behavior set forth in statutes delegating legislative power.
3
"
The complexities of the subject matter regulated by modern government
demand the delegation of power with essentially "meaningless" standards to
guide administrative activity. 38 Otherwise, a regulatory agency would be
unable to deal effectively with problems unforeseeable at the time of the
legislative enactinent. 39 Likewise, legislators would be unable to formulate
standards in sufficient detail to insure agency flexibility. 40 One author has
suggested that attention should shift from legislative reluctance to provide
agencies with precise standards. Instead, the focus should be upon safeguards
and the promulgation of rules and self-imposed standards by regulatory
agencies. 41 A delegation of regulatory power should not be held unconstitu-
tional because Congress failed to provide specific standards and safeguards. 42
Rather, courts should require the agency to define its own discretionary power
within a reasonable time.4 3
In any event, rules promulgated by federal agencies raise questions concern-
ing the pre-emption of coexisting state law. The issue is most pronounced
when Congress has expressed no intention to pre-empt state and local law,
but has merely delegated broad regulatory power to the agency. 44 A regula-
tion promulgated pursuant to these powers bears the force of federal law and,
under the supremacy clause, "must prevail if it conflicts with state law."4 5
Further, when the federal regulations are comprehensive, state law must yield
even if "that particular phase of the subject has not been taken up by the
federal agency."
46
37. E.g., New York Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 24 (1932) (rpublic
interest"); Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420, 431 (1930) ("just and
reasonable'); see Davis, supra note 36, at § 2.01 for further examples.
38. Davis, supra note 36, at § 2.01; see United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co.,
287 U.S. 77, 85 (1932).
39. Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 713, 720 (1969); Davis, supra
note 36, at § 2.05.
40. See Davis, supra note 36, at § 2.05.
41. Davis, supra note 36, at § 2.08. See United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 652 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 596-98 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
42- Davis, supra note 36, at § 2.08.
43. Id.
44. E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1715b (1970) ("The Secretary [of HUD] is authorized and directed to
make such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this
subchapter [on mortgage insurance]").
45. Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 668 (1962) (Treasury regulations governing United States
savings bonds pre-empted conflicting Texas community property law); Public Util. Comm'n v.
United States, 355 U.S. 534, 542-44 (1958) (federal law and regulations concerning special rates
for shipment of government property displaced California statute intended to require state
approval). Wallach, supra note 25, at 265 (1975). A critical qualification of this proposition is that
regulations must be within the proper exercise of power delegated to the agency'. Id.; see also
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 151-52 (1967).
46. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767. 774 (1947).
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The pre-emption doctrine should grant primacy to agency regulations since
these are merely extensions of congressional intent that the agency have
jurisdiction in a particular field. 47 In determining the pre-emptive nature of a
federal regulation, attention should focus on agency intent to displace state
law pursuant to a broad grant of regulatory power. 48 One writer has
suggested that congressional intent to pre-empt should not be as crucial a
consideration here as it is in a traditional analysis of federal and state
statutes.4 9 This shift in perspective would enable agencies to effect policies
within their particular expertise and insure that these will not be encumbered
by conflicting state schemes.
50
While they continue to discuss congressional intent, the courts have im-
pliedly sanctioned agency pre-emptive intent as the controlling factor in
several cases where congressional intent was unclear and the state law at issue
did not conflict with a federal statute.5 Thus, when a federal regulatory
agency has demonstrated hostility to a state law, pre-emption has occurred.52
"[T]he construction of a statute by those charged with its execution should be
followed unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong .... "-3
II. SECTIONS 220 AND 221 OF THE NATIONAL HOUSING ACT
Since the establishment of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) in
1934,5 4 Congress has recognized multifamily housing programs as an increas-
ingly important means of improving urban areas and coping with total
47. Wallach, supra note 25, at 265.
48. Id. at 276.
49. Id.
50. Id. The author proposes a two-tier model for analyzing pre-emption problems: 1)
congressional grant of broad regulatory power, and 2) agency intent to pre-empt the field.
51. Federal Pre-emption, supra note 13, at 855-56.
52. Id. at 855; City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973);
Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), affd without opinion,
405 U.S. 1035 (1972). Likewise, when an agency has cooperated with or expressed its assent to a
state scheme, pre-emption will not occur. Federal Pre-emption, supra note 13, at 855; see New
York Dep't of Social Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973); Chrysler Corp. v. Tofany, 419 F.2d
499 (2d Cir. 1969).
53. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969). "This court is not at liberty
to substitute its own discretion for that of administrative officers who have kept within the
bounds of their administrative powers" unless "[w]hat has been ordered [is] 'so entirely at odds
with fundamental principles . . .' as to be the expression of a whim rather than an exercise of
judgment." A.T. & T. Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232, 236-37 (1936) (citations omitted).
54. Fitzpatrick, FHA and FNMA Assistance for Multifamily Housing, 32 Law and Contemp.
Prob. 439 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Fitzpatrick). The Department of Housing and Urban
Development was established in 1965. 42 U.S.C. § 3532 (1970). All the functions, powers and
duties of the FHA have been transferred to the Secretary of HUD. FHA is now a division of
HUD and administers programs of the Department relating to the private mortgage market. H.R.
Rep. No. 214, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967).
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housing demand.5 5 Two such programs enacted in 1955 are central to the
pre-emption issue discussed in this Note. Sections 2 2 0S6 and 221" of the
National Housing Act (NHA) provide FHA mortgage insurance to com-
plementary sets of housing projects in order to effect an integrated urban
renewal scheme. 58
Congress enacted section 220 of the NHA "to aid in the elimination of
slums and blighted conditions and the prevention of the deterioration of
residential property .... *S9 The statute is designed to encourage private
participation by providing federally guaranteed mortgages to those who invest
in the construction of new dwellings or the rehabilitation of old dwellings in
areas of slum clearance and urban redevelopment. 60 Further, the Secretary of
HUD may "in his discretion require such mortgagor to be regulated or
restricted as to rents or sales, charges, capital structure, rate of return and
methods of operation .... -61
The companion section 221 of the NHA was enacted to finance private
investors who provide housing for low and moderate income families and
those displaced by urban renewal. 62 Section 221 offers two distinct features to
eligible mortgagors-federal insurance on long-term mortgages 63 and below-
market interest rates on loans insured by the FHA. 64
The below-market interest rate (BMIR) program was added to the NHA in
1961 specifically to induce the private sector to maximize its role in satisfying
the total housing demand. 65 Public housing costs have since been estimated to
55. Fitzpatrick, supra note 54, at 439. In the Housing Act of 1949, Congress enunciated what
has since been the goal of national housing policy-"a decent home and a suitable living
environment for every American family. ... 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970). See 42 U.S.C. § 144 la
(1970), as amended, (Supp. IV 1974), in which Congress renewed this goal.
56. 12 U.S.C. § 1715k (1970), as amended (1974).
57. 12 U.S.C. § 17151 (1970), as amended (1974).
58. See Prothro & Schomer, The Section 221(d)(3) Below Market Interest Rate Program for
Low and Moderate Income Families, 11 N.Y.L.F. 16, 18 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Prothro &
Schomer]. See Tenants' Council v. Lynn, 497 F.2d 648, 651-52 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 970 (1974).
59. 12 U.S.C. § 1715k(a) (1970).
60. 12 U.S.C. § 1715k(a), (d) (1970); Tenants' Council v. Lynn, 497 F.2d 648, 650 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied 419 U.S. 970 (1974); Columbia Plaza Ltd. Partnership v. Cowles. 403 F.
Supp. 1337, 1340 (D.D.C. 1975).
61. 12 U.S.C. § 1715k(d)(2)(A) (1970) (emphasis added).
62. 12 U.S.C. § 1715/(a) (1970). See 24 C.F.R, § 221.3 (1976) which defines the term
"displaced family" as one "displaced from an urban renewal area, or as a result of governmental
action, or as a result of a disaster determined by the President to be a major disaster." See also 24
C.F.R. § 221.537 (1976).
63. The term approved is usually 40 years. Fitzpatrick, supra note 54, at 440. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 17151(d)(3)(iii) (1970) for financing details depending on the class of mortgagor and whether a
new construction or rehabilitation case is involved.
64. 12 U.S.C. § 17151(d)(5) (1970).
65. 1961 U.S. Code Cong. and Ad. News 1923, 1925, 2016-17 (1961).
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exceed private financing by 15%.66 Further, the private sector has been
reluctant to invest in lower income housing.
6 7
The BMIR program was also designed to increase the housing supply for
families with incomes sufficiently high to deny them public housing eligibility,
yet too low to permit home ownership at current market rates. 68 One report
has estimated that rents under a BMIR program are 15 to 20% below those
resulting from ordinary private financing. 69 The success of this approach is
attributed to the special assistance powers of the Government National
Mortagage Association (GNMA) 70 which has been authorized to purchase
mortgages insured under section 221(d)(3). 7 1 Private lenders, by their very
nature, would not accept below-market interest rate mortgages.7 2 Hence, the
BMIR program is a valuable supplement to the FHA mortgage insurance
scheme and has already provided the impetus for expanded participation by
private enterprise in the area of low and moderate income housing."3
Section 221 maintains strict eligibility requirements for prospective
mortgagors 74 and HUD continues to exercise broad control over project
owners while the mortgage relationship persists.75 The statute is replete with
66. Low Income Housing: Section 236 of the National Housing Act and the Tax Reform Act
of 1969, 31 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 443, 444 (1970), citing Statement of Robert C. Weaver, Secretary of
the U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development (August 5, 1967).
67. Id. See Note, Government Programs to Encourage Private Investment in Low-Income
Housing, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1295, 1295-96 (1968).
68. 1961 U.S. Code Cong. and Ad. News 1923, 1929-30 (1961).
69. Prothro & Schomer, supra note 58, at 20 n.25.
70. 12 U.S.C. § 1720 (1970). In 1968, Congress divided what had formerly been the Federal
National Mortgage Association (FNMA) into two parts. The first is a government sponsored
private corporation, still known as FNMA, which operates in the secondary mortgage market.
The second is the GNMA, a government corporation, which operates the special assistance
functions of the old FNMA under the National Housing Act. See Note, The Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1968: Private Enterprise and Low-Income Housing, 10 Win. & Mary L.
Rev. 936, 950-53 (1969).
71. 12 U.S.C. § 1720(h) (1970). Section 221(d)(5) of the National Housing Act provides that
mortgages shall bear interest at below market rates with an established minimum of 3% or "the
annual rate of interest determined ... by estimating the average market yield to maturity on Ill
outstanding marketable obligations of the United States .... " whichever is lower. 12 U.S.C. §
17151(d)(5) (1970).
72. Prothro & Schomer, supra note 58, at 21.
73. Fitzpatrick, supra note 54, at 450; Prothro & Schomer, supra note 58, at 26,
74. Four classes of mortgagors are eligible for assistance under this section-public agencies,
cooperatives, limited dividend corporations, and private non-profit corporations or associations.
12 U.S.C. § 17151(d)(3) (1974). The statute excepts from eligibility projects assisted or to be
assisted under section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937. Id. HUD regulations specify
further qualifications for each class. 24 C.F.R. §§ 221.510(a), 221.532(a) (1976). All projects
assisted by mortgage insurance under section 22 1(d)(3) must contain five or more family units, are
restricted to rental and cooperative use, and must accommodate low and moderate income families.
12 U.S.C. §§ 17151(f) (1974), 17151(d)(3)(iii) (1970). HUD has promulgated a regulation concerning
income limits and other qualifications for occupancy in 22 1(d)(3) projects with preference granted
to displaced families. 24 C.F.R. § 221.537 (1976).
75. 24 C.F.R. § 221.529 (1976).
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broad grants of discretion to the Secretary of HUD in a wide variety of areas
relevant to the housing industry. 76 Of particular import here is the Secretary's
power to determine whether rents, charges and methods of operation in a
221(d)(3) project will be supervised by "Federal or State laws or by political
subdivisions of States, or agencies thereof, or by the Secretary under a
regulatory agreement or otherwise . . .,77
I. THE HUD LOCAL RENT CONTROL REGULATION
The ability of states or political subdivisions thereof to enact rent control
statutes affecting housing within their jurisdictions is clearly a proper exercise
of the police power. 78 In the specific area of projects insured by the FHA
under sections 220 and 221 of the NHA, the Secretary of HUD is empowered
to regulate rents at his discretion. 79 FHA project owners within the concur-
rent jurisdiction of state and federal regulations have expressed great concern
over the power of local boards to control rents charged in their buildings.80
The problem becomes most critical when local rent control boards approve
rents below those specifically established by HUD in order to "maintain the
economic soundness of the project" and "provide a reasonable return on the
investment consistent with providing reasonable rentals to tenants.''s HUD
has concluded that inadequate rental limits imposed by local boards are a
significant cause of FHA project default.8 2
The defaults are leading to a substantial number of mortgage insurance claims by
mortgagees upon HUD and to the withdrawal from the nation's housing stock of an
increasing number of units for low income families.8 3
When a federally insured project owner fails to meet his mortgage pay-
ments, the FHA must reimburse the mortgagee, a process which may cost
several millions of dollars.8 4 The FHA must also assume control over the
project, either by assignment or foreclosure, and search for a new pur-
chaser.8 5 Thus, HUD has an overriding economic interest in preventing
mortgage default. Further, if the goals of the Housing Act of 1949 are ever to
be attained, the Department has a social interest in maintaining the nation's
housing supply for low income families at an adequate and stable level.
Congress did not expressly pre-empt state rent control laws in the NHA;
6
nor have the courts been consistent in finding that state rent control laws
conflict with the federal scheme. 87 In fact, early decisions indicated that the
76. Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243, 1246 (1st Cir. 1970).
77. 12 U.S.C. § 17151(d)(3) (1974).
78. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 68-69 (1972).
79. See notes 61, 77 supra and accompanying text.
80. 40 Fed. Reg. 8189 (1975).
81. 24 C.F.R. §§ 207.19(e), 221.531(c) (1976).
82. 40 Fed. Reg. 8189 (1975).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243, 1247 n.5 (1st Cir. 1970).
86. See note 109 infra.
87. See notes 134-40, 146 infra and accompanying text.
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NHA is not a rent control statute, precluding pre-emption on direct conflict
grounds. 88 HUD established its position on the relationship of local rent
control to FHA insured projects in a rule promulgated on October 22, 1975
with the express purpose of maintaining rents in these projects at a level
which is reasonable for tenants, yet sufficient to absorb mortgage payments
and other reasonable expenses of project operation.8 9 This regulation distin-
guishes between unsubsidized and subsidized insured projects9" and varies the
pre-emption policy accordingly.
Subsidized insured projects include those receiving below-market interest
rates under section 221(d)(3) and (5) of the NHA. 9 1 In view of the particularly
critical economic status of subsidized projects, HUD expressly pre-empted the
entire field of rent regulation by state and local rent control boards. 92
The Department finds that it is necessary and desirable to minimize defaults by the
mortgagor in its financial obligations with regard to projects covered by. this subpart,
and to assist mortgagors to preserve the continued viability of those projects as a
housing resource for low income families. The Department also finds that it is
necessary and desirable to protect the substantial economic interest of the Federal
Government in those projects. 93
The HUD regulation also formally establishes the Department's pre-
emption policy with respect to unsubsidized projects. 94 Section 220 of the
NHA is covered by this regulation subpart which refers to those projects
which are not subsidized, as defined by the regulation, but have mortgages
insured or held by HUD. 95 Presumably because of the greater rental yield and
other factors which make higher income projects a more favorable invest-
ment, 96 HUD has determined that the threat of mortgage default is not as
88. See note 134 infra and accompanying text.
89. 40 Fed. Reg. 49318-21 (1975). HUD had published an interim rule to the same effect on
February 26, 1975. 40 Fed. Reg. 8189-90 (1975).
90. 24 C.F.R. § 403.4 (unsubsidized), 403.8 (subsidized) (1976).
91. 24 C.F.R. § 403.8 (1976). Other subsidized projects affected by this section are those
receiving "interest reduction payments pursuant to Section 236 of the [NHA] . . . direct loans at
below-market interest rates pursuant to Section 202 of the Housing Act of 1959; or . . . rent
supplement payments pursuant to Section 101 of the Housing and Urban Development Act of
1965 and/or housing assistance payments . . . ." Id.
92. 24 C.F.R. § 403.9 (1976).
93. Id. The regulation further provides the procedure by which the mortgagor may apply for
an increase in rental charges. While processing the application, HUD must notify the board
having jurisdiction over the project that the Department has pre-empted the entire field of rent
control with respect to subsidized insured projects. Within ten days of the rent increase approval
by HUD, the mortgagor must provide the appropriate board with a schedule of the new rents.
However, this notice is strictly informative, since the rent control board has no power to approve
or disapprove the rental increase. 24 C.F.R. § 403.10 (1976).
94. 24 C.F.R. § 403.4 (1976).
95. Id.
96. See Comment, Low Income Housing: Section 236 of the National Housing Act and the
Tax Reform Act of 1969, 31 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 443, 444 (1970) (lower income housing involves the
additional risks of tenant neglect, vandalism, difficulty in collection rent, and high turnover
rates).
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critical in the field of unsubsidized projects as it is when subsidized housing is
involved. 97 Consequently, the Department has decided not to pre-empt state
and local rent control boards in this area, but rather to analyze the supremacy
issue on a case-by-case basis. 98
The Department will generally not interfere in the regulation by a local rent control
board ... of rents for unsubsidized projects with mortgages insured or held by HUD.
However, HUD will preempt the regulation of rents for such a project when the
Department determines that the delay or decision of a board . . . jeopardizes the
Department's economic interest in the project.99
Upon issuing its interim rule, HUD invited concerned persons to submit
comments and suggestions with respect to its content.10 0 A cross section of the
responses1 0 ' reveals the basic objections that have been made to the regula-
tion in subsequent cases.
Several comments maintained that Congress did not intend that the NHA
pre-empt state rent control boards,10 2 nor did it delegate such authority to the
Secretary of HUD.1 0 3 It was also suggested that there is no conflict between
the NHA and local rent control laws because the two schemes strive to
achieve the same goal-adequate housing for low and moderate income
families at reasonable rents. 104 In addition, many local ordinances provide for
annual rent increases and allow a landlord to request hardship increases
should he be unable to meet his mortgage payments. 0 5 Under this reasoning,
state and local laws should be able to insure against project default without
federal interference.
A number of comments indicated that mortgage defaults were not caused
by the deficiencies of local rent control, but rather by the mismanagement and
97. 40 Fed. Reg. 49319 (1976).
98. Id.; 24 C.F.R. § 403.5 (1976).
99. 24 C.F.R. § 403.5 (1976). The procedure under this subpart for a mortgagor to apply for
rental increases also reflects the HUD policy to analyze unsubsidized projects on an individ-
ualized basis when reaching a pre-emption determination. The mortgagor must submit applica-
tions to both HUD and the appropriate state or local rent control board, providing the latter with
notice that HUD is also considering the rental increase issue and has the authority under the
regulation to supersede the board's decision. The mortgagor must inform the Department if the
board has delayed or approved rents lower than those authorized by HUD and must support his
contention that the board's delay or decision has placed the economic interest in his project in
jeopardy. HUD may then decide upon a review of the relevant information whether pre-emption
is indicated. 24 C.F.R_ § 403.6 (1976).
100. 40 Fed. Reg. 8190 (1975).
101. Id. at 49318. Five hundred and forty-four were form letters from tenants protesting the
rule. The remainder contained substantive comments and suggestions for technical changes.
Some of these were implemented in the final rule. Id. at 49318-19.
102. Id. at 49319; e.g., Letter No. 7, on file in HUD Office of General Council, Washington,
D.C. [hereinafter these letters will be cited as Letter No. .. ].
103. 40 Fed. Reg. 49319 (1975).
104. Letter No. 7, supra note 102.
105. Letters No. 7, 14, 19, supra note 102.
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greed of profit-oriented landlords who failed to provide adequate services. ' 0 6
Finally, a common theme throughout the responses maintained that rent
control should be a matter of local concern and that pre-emption would
inevitably result in higher rents imposed by a federal agency insensitive to the
hardship suffered by low income tenants already beleagured by inflation and
unemployment. 107
IV. PRE-EMPTION DOCTRINE AND THE FEDERAL HOUSING SCHEME
Prior to any pre-emption analysis, it should be noted that the National
Housing Act constitutes a valid exercise of the federal commerce power. 108
Congress did not expressly pre-empt state and local regulation of rents in
projects financed by federal mortage insurance under the NHA. 109 Therefore,
the NHA must be considered in conjunction with the HUD regulations in
order to determine if state and local rent control laws will be nullified with
respect to FHA projects. 10 To date, few courts have considered this specific
issue.
In Levin-Sagner-Orange v. Rent Leveling Board,"' the Superior Court of
New Jersey considered the validity of the HUD regulation and its pre-emptive
capability with respect to a local rent control ordinance. Plaintiffs, the owners
of a federally insured project subsidized under section 221(d)(3) of the
NHA, 112 applied to HUD for a monthly rental increase. When HUD ap-
proved the application, defendant rent leveling board notified the plaintiffs
and their tenants that the increase was void under the local ordinance.
The court held that the HUD regulation, pre-empting the entire field of
rent regulation," 3 was a valid exercise of the Secretary's rule-making author-
106. 40 Fed. Reg. 49319 (1975); Letters No. 10, 14, supra note 102.
107. Letters No. 10, 14, supra note 102. "HUD's consideration of 'economic interest' without
a simultaneous measurement of human cost is to be expected more from the real estate and
banking interests which these regulations will serve than from a governmental agency presumably
operating in the public interest." Letter No. 14, supra note 102.
108. See Druker v. Sullivan, 334 F. Supp. 861, 862-63 (D. Mass. 1971), aff'd, 458 F.2d 1272
(1st Cir. 1972); Levin-Sagner-Orange v. Rent Leveling Bd., 142 N.J. Super. 429, 435 (L. Div.
1976); see note 21 supra and accompanying text.
Congress may regulate private individuals and businesses within the concurrent jurisdiction of
the states subject to the limitation that " 'the means chosen by (Congress) must be reasonably
adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution.' " National League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S. Ct.
2465, 2469 (1976), quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 262 (1964).
The Supreme Court in Usery held that Congress may not exercise its commerce power to abrogate
the state's exercise of its essential governmental function. However, this does not prevent Congress
from "regulating individual businesses necessarily subject to the dual sovereignty of the govern-
ment of the Nation and of the State in which they reside." Id. at 2471.
109. Druker v. City of Boston, 410 F. Supp. 1314, 1319-20 (D. Mass. 1976); Columbia Plaza
Ltd. Partnership v. Cowles, 403 F. Supp. 1337, 1342 (D.D.C. 1975).
110. See notes 24, 44-45 supra and accompanying text.
111. 142 N.J. Super. 429 (L. Div. 1976).
112. The project was a limited dividend enterprise, hence an eligible mortgagor under section
221(d)(3) of the NHA. See note 74 supra and accompanying text.
113. See notes 92-93 supra and accompanying text.
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ity. 114 It further noted that section 221(d)(3) gives the Secretary the power to
choose whether rents in a given project should be regulated by local, state or
federal law, or by the Secretary under a regulatory agreement."s Under this
reasoning, the HUD regulation pre-empting the entire field of rent regulation
with respect to 221(d)(3) projects is a mere formalization of a clear choice
already granted by Congress to the Secretary. Further, the purpose of section
221 was to provide housing for low and moderate income families and those
displaced by urban renewal.11 6 Based upon its experience, HUD determined
that rent levels imposed by local rent control boards contribute to mortgage
default and loss of available housing and investor interest.13 7 Hence, the
HUD regulation is necessary to carry out the provisions of section 221 and is a
proper exercise of the Secretary's authority."18
The Levin court refused to interfere with the judgment of administrative
officials made pursuant to granted powers,' 9 and attached the full force of a
federal statute to the regulation, once its validity was established.120 Pre-
emption followed since the local ordinance could not exert control when it had
been expressly nullified.l 2 1
A frequent criticism of the HUD regulation has been that rent control
should be a matter of local concern, traditionally regulated under the state's
police power.12 2 The Levin court addressed itself to the contention that the
HUD regulation violates the tenth amendment'2 3 and held that "[t]o the
extent the local ordinance and the federal law conflict, the National Housing
Act and valid regulations made pursuant thereto must prevail.'1 2
In another New Jersey case, Edgemere at Somerset v. Johnson, 125 the court
also considered the validity of the HUD regulation and its ability to pre-empt
114. 142 N.J. Super. at 433-35.
115. Id. at 433. One court in dictum has interpreted section 221(d)(3) to indicate that the
Secretary may regulate rents in such projects under a regulatory agreement only in default of
regulation by some federal, state or local body. Langevin v. Chenango Ct., Inc. 447 F.2d 296,
300 n.7 (2d Cir. 1971). However, there is no indication in the statute that one form of regulation
should take precedence over another. Rather, the clause granting the Secretary the discretion to
determine which form of regulation is most conducive to the purposes of section 221 seems to
apply with equal weight to each class of regulation listed.
116. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
117. 142 N.J. Super. at 434; see notes 82-83 supra and accompanying text.
118. 12 U.S.C. § 1715b (1970). City of Boston v. Hills, No. 75-902-C (D. Mass. April 18,
1975) held without discussion that the HUD regulation was within the scope of authority granted
to the agency by Congress.
119. 142 N.J. Super. at 434-35.
120. Id. at 436; see note 45 supra and accompanying text.
121. Id. at 437; see note 28 supra and accompanying text.
122. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 68-69 (1972) (landlord-tenant relationship has
traditionally been a matter of local concern).
123. See note 17 supra.
124. 142 N.J. Super. at 435 (emphasis added).
125. No. T15-285 (N.J. Somerset County Ct., March 23, 1976) [hereinafter cited as
Edgemere].
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a local rent control ordinance. The apartment complex at issue was charac-
terized as an unsubsidized project financed with FHA mortgage insurance
under the NHA. Plaintiff-landlord applied to HUD for a rent increase. The
agency pre-empted the local rent control ordinance, having determined that
rent levels authorized by the local board placed the project in economic
jeopardy since they were insufficient to meet operating costs and mortgage
payments. 126 The court found that the HUD regulation was a valid exercise
of the broad authority granted to the Secretary of HUD by Congress in order
to carry out the purposes of the NHA.127 Once valid, the regulation assumed
the qualities of a federal statute and superseded the conflicting local rent
control board decision. 128
Critics of the HUD regulation have claimed that many local rent control
laws provide hardship clauses enabling a project owner to apply to the local
board for rent increases to absorb operating expenses or mortgage pay-
ments. 129 The theory is that such local laws could not conflict with federal
regulations since both strive to maintain mortgagor solvency.130 The court in
Edgemere, however, noted that increases allowed by local boards were
frequently unrelated to the costs of operating and maintaining a project."'3
Further, burdensome and dilatory local procedures often engendered the very
project defaults they were designed to prevent. 1 32 The court noted that
pre-emption of such laws seemed to be the only alternative available to HUD
in order to protect its economic interest in FHA projects. 133
In contrast, a series of recent cases have specifically held that the NHA is
not a rent control statute and as such cannot conflict with local and state laws
regulating rents in FHA projects.134 These decisions turned on the fact that,
126. Id. at 3. Since the project is unsubsidized, 24 C.F.R. § 403.5 (1976) applies. See notes
95-99 supra and accompanying text.
127. Edgemere, supra note 125, at 5.
128. Id. at 8.
129. See note 105 supra and accompanying text.
130. HUD regulations affecting sections 220 and 221 of the NHA provide that in approving
rents and charges in a federally insured project, HUD will consider the "[rlental income necessary
to maintain the economic soundness of the project." 24 C.F.R. §§ 207.19(e)(1), 221.531(c)(1)
(1976).
131. Edgemere, supra note 125, at 5. Presumably, such allowances arc frequently inadequate
to meet project costs and maintain mortgagor solvency. See 40 Fed. Reg. 49318-19 (1975).
132. "[T]he procedures necessary for a mortgagor to obtain a hardship increase from a local
rent control board were so cumbersome and took so long that, when the increase was approved, it
was often too late to prevent the project from going into default." 40 Fed. Reg. at 49319. See, e.g.,
the local procedure in Druker v. City of Boston, 410 F. Supp. 1314 (D. Mass. 1976), discussed at
note 149 infra and accompanying text.
133. Edgemere, supra note 125, at 5.
134. Columbia Plaza Ltd. Partnership v. Cowles, 403 F. Supp. 1337, 1342 (D.D.C. 1975) ("§
220 is not a rent control measure at all; thus, there is no federal system of rent control in effect');
Helmsley v. Borough of FoKLLej, 362-F.'Supp. 581, 590 (D.N.J. 1973); Stoneridge Apts., Co. v.
Lindsay, 303 F. Supp. 677, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) ("The (local] ordinance deals with rent control
pure and simple. It cannot conflict with federal legislation on this subject, since there is none.
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prior to the promulgation of the HUD regulation on local rent control, the
Department had chosen only to regulate the maximum rents FHA project
owners could charge their tenants.' 3s This was equally true with respect to
both mortgage insurance programs under sections 220 and 221 of the
NHA. 136 For example, under section 220 of the NHA, the Secretary is fully
authorized to regulate rents charged by mortgagors.137 However, the De-
partment had decided to issue a regulation providing only the maximum rents
which a project owner can charge.' 38 It has been held that by establishing
maximum rents, HUD sought to promote the solvency and continuity of
insured projects while preventing huge returns.' 39 Such an "interest is not
necessarily impaired by a rent control measure that sets a ceiling beneath the
maximum fixed by the Secretary." 140
The court in Edgemere found that the NHA is not itself a rent control
mechanism. 141 However, the new HUD regulation has specifically substituted
the phrase "increases in rental charges" for "maximum permissible rents" in
order to emphasize that when HUD processes a request for rent increases, it is
determining the minimum rents necessary to meet operating expenses and
mortgage payments. 14
2
The Edgemere court noted that, as a result of the substituted phrase, both
federal and local schemes could not be satisfied since the HUD minimum
exceeded the local board maximum. 143 The inescapable conflict mandated
nullification of the local law.144
The only federal legislation relevant to the discussion is the National Housing Act, the subject
matter of which . .. is unrelated to that of rent control.").
135. Columbia Plaza Ltd. Partnership v. Cowles, 403 F. Supp. 1337, 1341 (D.D.C. 1975). For
example, the HUD regulation concerning the establishment of rents in section 220 projects forbids
the mortgagor from charging amounts "in excess of those approved by the Commissioner
C.F.R. § 207.19(e) (1976). The standard regulatory agreement which the Secretary of HUD enters
into with section 220 mortgagors contains similar language and likewise provides only for
maximum rents. 403 F. Supp. at 1340.
136. Although the HUD regulation applicable to rents in federally subsidized projects under
221(d)(3) does not refer to the establishment of rent maximums, the standard regulatory
agreement provides that owners may not charge rents exceeding those established by the
Commissioner of the FHA. See Druker v. City of Boston, 410 F. Supp. 1314, 1316 (D. Mass.
1976).
137. See note 61 supra and accompanying text; Columbia Plaza Ltd. Partnership v. Cowles,
403 F. Supp. 1337, 1340 (D.D.C. 1975).
138. Id. at 1341; see note 135 supra.
139. Id. at 1342.
140. Id.
141. Edgemere, supra note 125, at 7.
142. Id. at 7-8; 24 C.F.R. § 403.6(a) (1976); 40 Fed. Reg. 49319 (1975)
143. Edgemere, supra note 125, at 8.
144. Id. The court in Levin held that section 22 i(d)(3) of the NHA is not itself a rent control
statute since it merely gives the Secretary the option to regulate rents. However, the Secretary
decided to control rents directly in the HUD regulation on local rent control. Hence, the
regulation could pre-empt conflicting local law under the supremacy clause because both
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The controversy in Druker v. City of Boston 145 developed before the HUD
regulation pre-empting local rent control laws was promulgated. Although the
regulation has since been declared a proper exercise of authority by HUD,
Druker provides further justification by finding that the local ordinance
conflicted with the NHA itself. 146
Plaintiffs owned four housing developments financed with mortgage insur-
ance under section 221(d)(3) of the NHA. Each project owner had applied to
HUD for rent increases which were granted and subsequently denied or
reduced by the Boston Rent Board. At the time of litigation, three projects
were in mortgage default and investor dividends had not been paid. The
Boston rent control ordinance specifically applied to 221(d)(3) projects and
structured a hearing procedure for rent increases. Although the local law was
designed to yield the landlord " 'a fair net operating income,' ,147 the Druker
court found that it consistently derived a lower maximum rent than that
permitted by HUD.14 8 Further, the delay and expense inherent in the local
adversary system conflicted with the HUD mechanism which only affords
tenants in 22 1(d)(3) projects notice of impending rent increases and opportu-
nity to submit comments to HUD. 14 9 The court found that, since HUD
controlled only maximum rents in its projects, there was no bar to finding a
conflict with lower local rent schedules because the rents established by HUD
were in effect the minimum amount necessary to provide mortgage payments,
expenses and investor dividends.' 5 0
The court in Druker also discussed the proposed HUD regulation which
pre-empted local rent control with respect to 221(d)(3) projects.' s '
A careful reading of the history of HUD's treatment of the local rent control issue
would seem to indicate that its decision resulted from a realization of the coliflict with
national policy created by certain local rent stabilization programs. This did not signal
a change of policy .... Rather, it seems to have been a codification of policy which
had been evolving as HUD gained experience with the operation of local rent
control. 152
controlled the same subject matter. Levin-Sagner-Orange v. Rent Leveling Bd., 142 N.J. Super.
429, 437 (L. Div. 1976); see note 22 supra and accompanying text
145. 410 F. Supp. 1314 (D. Mass. 1976). See 6 Law Project Bull., Housing Section, issue 5 at
3-5 (June 1976).
146. 410 F. Supp. at 1320-21.
147. Id. at 1317.
148. Id. at 1319. "In arriving at maximum rents, HUD allows a fixed vacancy rate of 7%;
Boston permits 5% or the actual rate, whichever is lower. HUD permits certain expenditures to
be treated as expenses while the Rent Board requires them to be classified as capital. A third
difference is the fact that the Rent Board will often disallow expenses which HUD has accepted."
Id.
149. Id. at 1318 n.4, 1319. Tenants in 221(d)(3) projects must be notified by the mortgagor
thirty days before an application to HUD is made for a rent increase. Their comments on the
proposed increase may be sent to HUD.
150. Id. at 1320.
151. Id. at 1321.
152. Id. (emphasis added).
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Therefore, the HUD regulation pre-empting state rent control laws is valid
because it was promulgated pursuant to a broad grant of authority delegated
to the Secretary in order to effect the purposes of the NHA.15 3 Moreover, the
regulation is sound because it formally pre-empts many local rent control laws
already superseded by the NHA on conflict grounds. ' 5 4 Finally, the pervasive
nature of the NHA in conjunction with regulations pursuant thereto should
support a finding of pre-emption.'"
Critics of the HUD regulation have understandably maintained that a
federal agency should operate for the public benefit and place economic and
real estate interests below concern for human needs.15 6 The HUD regulations
of rents and charges under sections 220 and 221 of the NHA reflect the agency
goal to balance economic soundness of a project with reasonable rents for
tenants.15 7 When mortgage default is imminent and this balance is almost
impossible to maintain, HUD is forced to determine which interest shall take
precedence. Several courts have wrestled with this same issue when deciding
whether tenants in projects subsidized pursuant to section 221(d)(3) have a
statutory or due process right to participate in rental increase applications. IsS
Under the NHA, the government acts as an "insurer for private inves-
tors." 159 HUD enters into regulatory agreements with mortgagors for the
benefit of the public sector, "but its freedom to pursue social goals is limited
by the need to avoid excessive losses."1 60 Congress has not granted financial
assistance under 221(d)(3) directly to low and moderate income families, but
rather to private landlords who then lease the premises to eligible tenants. 16 '
Therefore, tenants have no legal right to low-cost housing, but rather only "an
abstract need or desire for it."'1 62 It has also been held that tenants residing in
153. See note 114 supra and accompanying text.
154. See note 152 supra and accompanying text.
155. Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1146 (8th Cir. 1971), aftfd
without opinion, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972); American Airlines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 399 F.2d
369, 376 n.4 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1017 (1969); see notes 34, 45-46 supra and
accompanying text.
156. See note 107 supra and accompanying text.
157. 24 C.F.R. §§ 207.19(e), 221.531(c) (1976).
158. Grace Towers Tenants Ass'n v. Grace Housing Dev. Fund Co., 538 F.2d 491 (2d Cir.
1976); Langevin v. Chenango Ct., Inc., 447 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1971); Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d
1243 (1st Cir. 1970). Each of these cases denied the existence of a due process or statutory right on
the part of tenants in projects financed pursuant to section 221(d)(3) to participate in HUD's
decision-making process. Contra, Marshall v. Lynn, 497 F.2d 643 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 970 (1974); Geneva Towers Tenants Org. v. Federated Mortgage Investors, 504 F.2d
483 (9th Cir. 1974).
159. Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243, 1247 (1st Cir. 1970).
160. Id. The court in Levin used this language to support the validity of the HUD regulation
pre-empting state rent control (24 C.F.R. § 403 (1976)). 142 N.J. Super. 429, 434 (1976).
161. Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d at 1247.
162. Grace Towers Tenants Ass'n v. Grace Housing Dev. Fund Co., 538 F.2d 491, 494 (2d
Cir. 1976), quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). The court in Marshall v.
Lynn, 497 F.2d 643 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 970 (1974), found that tenants in
housing financed under 221(d)(3) had a due process right to receive notice of proposed rent
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projects financed under section 220 of the NHA have no legal interest in the
establishment of rent levels since that program was not enacted to benefit any
specific class of needy tenants, but rather to eliminate urban blight.
63
HUD has determined that the substantial number of mortgage defaults
caused by local rent control laws has seriously depleted the nation's housing
stock for low income families. 164 As a practical matter, tenants would perhaps
be even more adversely affected by a total lack of available housing units than
by an increase in rental charges.165 It should be remembered that HUD
remains committed to providing housing at reasonable rents.' 66
HUD's expertise has also weighed heavily in the pre-emption of local rent
control laws. In Levin, the court said that "[d]eference must be paid to a
regulation issued by an agency exercising power expressly delegated to it by
Congress in developing and changing circumstances."' 67 The Druker court
found that HUD's intervention in the case on behalf of the plaintiff-landlords
was "entitled to some weight."' 6 Years of experience in the field of federally
assisted housing and broad delegation of power by Congress attach a certain
increases and an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 644, 648. The court found that section 221 of the
NHA with its BMIR incentives was designed to benefit low and moderate income tenants, not
private investors. Id. at 645-46. The Langevin court found no such right but recommended that
tenants be granted notice and opportunity to comment on the application for rent increases. 447
F.2d at 301-02. HUD has since promulgated a regulation which grants tenants in 221(d)(3)
projects the procedural rights mandated in Marshall and recommended in Langevin. 24 C.F.R. §
401 (1976).
163. Tenants' Council v. Lynn, 497 F.2d 648, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 VS.
970 (1974). Tenants in 220 projects tend to be upper-middle and upper-income groups. Id. at 649.
See also N.Y. Times, June 6, 1976, § 8, at 1, col. 1.
164. See note 82-83 supra and accompanying text.
165. The availability of rent supplement programs should tend to alleviate the burden of
increased rents. Hahn v. Gottieb, 430 F.2d 1243, 1247 (1st Cir. 1970).
166. 40 Fed. Reg. 49319 (1975).
167. Levin-Sagner-Orange v. Rent Leveling Bd., 142 N.J. Super. 429, 437 (L. Div. 1976).
168. Druker v. City of Boston, 410 F. Supp. 1314, 1321 (D. Mass. 1976). Other courts have
found agency hostility to the enforcement of state law a crucial factor in determining the outcome
of a pre-emption issue. In City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973),
the Supreme Court found that a Burbank city ordinance placing a curfew on evening jet flights
was pre-empted under the supremacy clause in the light of the pervasive nature of federal
regulation under the Noise Control Act of 1972 and by the Federal Aviation Administration. The
Court found two factors to be crucial in its determination to supersede the Burbank ordinance.
First, Congress had delegated broad authority to the Administrator of the FAA to issue
regulations concerning the use of navigable airspace. Id. at 627. Secondly, the FAA had
demonstrated opposition to local curfews as inconsistent with federal uniform control of navigable
airspace. Id. at 639-40. See Federal Pre-emption, supra note 13, at 857-59.
In Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd without
opinion, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972), the Eighth Circuit held that Minnesota regulations of radioactive
liquid and gaseous discharges in excess of those imposed by the Atomic Energy Commission were
pre-empted by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended in 1959. The court accorded "re-
spectful consideration" to the position taken by the AEC in a regulation interpreting the Act.
Id. at 1152. See Federal Pre-emption, supra note 13, at 861-62.
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degree of expertise to the agency's determination that local rent control laws
are a major cause of mortgagor insolvency.' 69 Further, there is a presumption
in favor of the agency's interpretation of the NHA which can only be
overcome by "compelling indications that it is wrong."' 170 Finally, it is not
necessary that Congress should have foreseen the precise development in
housing affairs which induced HUD to pre-empt local laws. 7 '
V. CONCLUSION
HUD's determination to assert jurisdiction over rent levels in projects with
FHA insured mortgages has changed the complexion of federal regulation in
this area. Since HUD has clarified the nature of approved rental increases as
the minimum necessary to maintain mortgagor solvency, the NHA and
attendant regulations have been, in effect, a federal system of rent control
with respect to those projects. 172 Cases prior to the regulation which held that
the NHA is not a rent control statute had relied upon the Department's
former decision to regulate only maximum rents. 73 Therefore, these decisions
are no longer valid and should not be cited to defeat the full regulation of
rents in FHA projects by HUD.
As in other situations where federal law displaces concurrent state regula-
tion of the same subject matter, two important and legitimate interests
conflict. 174 HUD has a clear economic stake in the solvency of its insured
projects and a governmental interest in providing adequate housing for urban
communities. The agency's expertise and need to deal with changing eco-
nomic circumstances cannot be overlooked. Understandably, tenants and
local rent boards are concerned with maintaining rents at an affordable level
due to spiraling inflation and other economic pressures. While both view-
points are meritorious, the federal interest has prevailed.
Several courts thus far have determined that the HUD regulation at issue is
a proper exercise of the Secretary's delegated authority and thus displaces
state and local rent control laws with respect to FHA insured projects.17 5 This
169. 142 N.J. Super. at 437; see notes 47-50 supra and accompanying text.
170. Cf. note 53 supra and accompanying text; see also Permian Basin Area Rate Cases. 390
U.S. 747, 767 (1968).
171. Cf. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 172 (1968).
172. The ability of the federal government to regulate the landlord-tenant relationship was
upheld by the Supreme Court in Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921). The Court found that
wartime circumstances in the District of Columbia justified a federal statute restricting the right
of a landlord to displace his tenants at the expiration of their lease "Housing is a necessary of life-
All the elements of a public interest justifying some degree of public control are present." Id. at
156. See also Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 383 (1974) where dictum provided that
Congress could entrust the area of landlord-tenant disputes to the supervision of an administra-
tive agency.
173. See note 134 supra and accompanying text.
174. E.g., Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1145 (8th Cir. 1971).
aff'd without opinion, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972), where the court noted the conflict between the need
for nuclear power and the maintenance of an ecological balance.
175. See notes 119-21, 127-28 supra and accompanying text.
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conclusion is supported by the Druker court which found that a local rent
control law conflicted with the NHA, all consideration of the HUD regulation
aside.' 76 The comprehensive nature of the NHA and the HUD regulations
justifies the displacement of local rent control laws in this area. 177
Mary Anne Wirth
176. See note 146 supra and accompanying text.
177. See notes 34, 54-77 supra and accompanying text.
